Adoption of ethical standards via implementing legislation, ethics laws and codes has been vigorously promoted in Serbia. Public officials and institutions generally receive ethics training and attention – educational programs are the primary means of informing society about the existence of and need for such principles and codes. However, the ethics aspects of anticorruption programs are intended to appeal only to the conscience of individuals, whereas the legal aspects of anticorruption programs set up the environment which is intended to suppress or eliminate corrupt practices. Too often, anticorruption programs overlook the fact that ethics and legal systems alone are not sufficient to effectively address corruption. Rather, it is properly established institutions that prove to be powerful anticorruption mechanisms. Such a systemic approach provides a framework for identifying both the sources of corruption and organizational behavior patterns which involve the political economic and social aspects to be addressed. A combination of ethical and legal anticorruption measures and an introduction of functional mechanisms that both suppress and protect against corruption makes the ethical and legal procedures effective. Moreover, the existence of established anticorruption institutions provides a metric of both positive and negative incentives (rewards and sanctions) towards corruption and allows a more reliable measurement of anticorruption indicators – rather than indicators based solely on the perception of the public. The authors’ experiences in Serbia reinforce this approach. The ethical aspect of anticorruption efforts centers around statements of principle, such as the principles encased within the Public Procurement Law. Ethics regulation and codes regarding conflicts of interest have also been introduced or discussed. The legal aspect of Serbia’s anticorruption initiative looks impressive on paper. The legislation which, directly or indirectly, prescribes anticorruption measures includes a long list of laws. The institutional aspect is reflected through a number of procedural changes, aimed at reducing the environment for corruption, such as the elected mayor, ensuring greater political competition and increased accountability but – with limited authority. Furthermore, independent offices, such as the procurement office, CitiStat system, citizen-assistance-centers, one-stop permitting centers, local ombudsman or local economic development office are proving to be effective, but their further institution building and organizational ‘health’ restoration is needed. In this paper, the authors will focus on proposing an exemplary system of tracking anticorruption mechanisms, as introduced by the concept of municipal public procurement offices, such as changed incentives (both positive and negative ones), unambiguously defined responsibilities, more transparent procedures and public procurement documents, clear rules about bid handling, centralized procurements (which are still questionable, with a number of pros and cons), measurable budget savings, defined procedures of communication between the finance and procurement departments, rigorous procedures for the protection of bidder’s rights and public interest, allowing for the submission of a request for protection in any stage of the public procurement procedure, clear distinction between the permanent professional procurement staff and ad hoc appointed staff (independent public procurement commissions), etc. Finally, a number of measurable, non-perception based anticorruption indicators will be proposed and discussed.